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Agreeable Authoritarians: Personality and Politics in Contemporary Russia 
Why do some people living under authoritarian regimes support and even vote for their 
rulers, while others do not? The underlying dynamics of regime support and opposition are 
central to our theories of revolution (Kuran 1991) and democratization (Bunce and Wolchik 
2011), and there has been voluminous research into patterns of political attitudes and voting in 
non-democratic and semi-democratic regimes. Most of the literature focuses on pocket-book or 
sociotropic economic sentiment (Magaloni 2006, Treisman 2011), social class (Roberts and Arce 
1998), ethnic identities (Posner 2005) and basic ideological orientations towards democracy and 
authoritarianism (Seligson and Tucker 2005). In addition, other strands in the literature stress the 
effect of regime strategies such as patronage distribution (Blaydes 2011), manipulation of media 
(Enikolopov et al. 2011) and cooptation (Reuter and Robertson 2015). 
However, students of political behavior have discovered that divergences in political 
opinions and behaviors have other, often deeper, sources of variation than economics, 
information or the behavior of political authorities. People in the same economic situation, with 
the same information, in the same social context can still differ wildly in their political 
perceptions and participation. One source of such variation are deep and durable orientations or 
personality traits that structure the different ways in which people experience and interpret their 
social surroundings and lead them to interact differently with the political world (Bakker et al. 
2015b, Gerber et al. 2010, Haidt and Joseph 2004, Hetherington and Weiller 2009, Mondak et al. 
2010).  
While we know increasing amounts about the relationship between personality traits and 
political preferences, social and economic orientations and participation in democracies, 
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contemporary thinking about the role of personality has not been explored in authoritarian 
contexts. However, the idea that support for authoritarianism might be related to personality is 
not new. Adorno et al. (1950) posited such a relationship more than 50 years ago in their highly 
influential book, “The Authoritarian Personality”, and others have used variants on Adorno’s 
concept to look at distributions of personality types in different regimes. In fact, the particular 
case we look at, Russia, has been a particularly rich source of theories on how personality and 
politics are shaped by everything from swaddling infants (Gorer and Rickman 1949) to 
government organized education (Mead 1951), to the experience of living in a state that 
officially espoused egalitarianism (McFarland et al. 1996). In this paper, we look at the 
relationship between personality and political regime drawing neither on Adorno nor the 
literature on authoritarian personalities (although our results are robust to including measures of 
authoritarianism), but instead by focusing on the most widely accepted contemporary approach 
to understanding and measuring personality in contemporary psychology – the so-called ‘Big 
Five’ personality traits of ‘openness’, ‘conscientiousness’, ‘extraversion’, ‘agreeableness’ and 
‘neuroticism’. In doing so we make three principal contributions. 
First, we show that the relationship between personality and politics changes enormously 
when we move out of the democratic context. While the personality traits of conscientiousness 
and openness are the central factors in determining political attitudes in most of the existing 
literature, they are not the most important factors in our study. Instead, agreeableness, a 
personality trait associated with a desire to maintain positive social relations, which the existing 
literature finds weakly and inconsistently related to politics, becomes the single most important 
and consistent trait affecting attitudes in authoritarian contexts.  How agreeable a citizen is plays 
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a central role in shaping that person’s vote choice, the emotions he or she feels toward the 
leadership, and his or her position on specific issues.  
 Second, our paper contributes to understanding the mechanisms that connect personality 
and politics. The issue of just how personality traits interact with context to create specific 
outcomes at the individual level is a cutting edge issue in personality psychology (Fleeson and 
Jayawickreme 2015) and one we cannot resolve definitively here. Nevertheless, there are a 
number of features of authoritarian regimes that we argue are likely to shape the relationship 
between personality and politics. While democracy legitimizes the existence of different political 
positions, autocracy delegitimizes difference and disagreement, particularly in contexts where 
the regime is able to link support for the incumbents with patriotism. The de-legitimization of 
dissent is reinforced by state media, political leaders and officially approved social institutions. 
In such a context, to disagree is to invite conflict, leading opposition to be primarily the domain 
of people willing to accept social marginalization.  
We illustrate this causal chain using the example of attitudes to gay rights. Modeling the 
relationship between personality and political preferences as mediated by other factors, we 
present evidence that personality traits matter mostly indirectly, primarily by shaping media 
choices, basic political orientations and attachment to the official church, factors that in turn have 
a large effect on attitudes. Hence, the relationship between personality and politics is highly 
contextual. Rather than simply underpinning an innate preference for liberal or conservative 
leaders, or for pluralism or authoritarianism, how personality interacts with politics depends 
heavily upon the nature of the political environment.   
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Third, the research presented here also has important implications beyond the literature 
on personality and politics, contributing to a new way of thinking about the political foundations 
of authoritarian regimes and the potential sources of political change. To date, political 
psychology is marginalized in the study of regime dynamics, which have typically been 
understood in largely material terms (Acemoglu and Robinson 2009, Magaloni 2006). The most 
influential analyses of regime change that focus primarily on individual level psychology are 
either strictly rationalist in orientation (Lohmann 1994) or rely on preference falsification (Kuran 
1991), By contrast, we provide a richer and more realistic perspective on how authoritarianism is 
constructed and how it might change by basing our analysis on well-established general 
conceptions of human psychology. Our results confirm earlier work emphasizing the importance 
of social conformity to authoritarian regimes (Havel 1985) and suggest an empirically tractable 
way of monitoring key factors likely to shape dynamics. 
Our arguments are based on evidence from contemporary Russia. In developing our 
story, we seek to be explicit about what might be general and what might be specific to the 
Russian case. To the extent that our findings are a product of unique features of Russian culture 
or history, the argument may not travel far. However, there are a number of features of 
contemporary authoritarianism in Russia that are quite general. In recent years, Russia has 
shifted from a relatively soft form of authoritarianism to a variant that involves considerably 
more coercion, control and mobilization, as the state actively tries to mobilize a “healthy” and 
“patriotic” majority against threats from outsiders and “deviants”. This strategy of accentuating 
an “us” and “them” distinction is clearly an important tool used by a variety of contemporary 
authoritarians. Moreover, the political strategy of the regime is implemented in a context where 
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the state plays a major role in the economy and where politics are largely de-ideologized, 
conditions that are common in the contemporary world.   
Personality Traits 
The idea that there are deep underlying personality traits at the individual level that shape 
how a person interacts with others and the world has a long theoretical and empirical history in 
psychology (John and Srivastava 1999). The basic model of personality traits sees them as “core 
dispositional personality traits” that are prior to “values, [and] attitudes (including political 
attitudes such as ideology)” (Gerber et al. 2010: 113). Traits are acquired very early in life (Caspi 
et al. 2003) as a result of the interaction of genetics (Bouchard 1994) and early childhood 
experiences (Krueger et al. 2006, Mondak et al. 2010). Traits show significant stability over the 
course of a person’s life (Caspi and Bem 1990, McCrae and Costa 1984), though they can 
continue to evolve even into old age (Roberts and Mroczek 2008).  
While there are a number of different ways of conceptualizing personality, much of the 
most promising work in contemporary personality research focuses on the so-called “Big Five” 
personality traits (Goldberg 1981). The term “Big Five” is intended to underline not just the 
importance of the five traits, but also the fact that the traits are conceptualized at a high level of 
abstraction and that each contains sub-elements within it. While there are differences of opinion 
over the labels used, the five factors are generally labeled openness/intellect, conscientiousness, 
extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism (OCEAN).  
Research on the Big Five in psychology has been prodigious, both in the direction of 
tracing the sources of traits and in understanding their effects. Work by personality 
neuroscientists has uncovered the roots of traits in the biology of the brain, demonstrating 
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associations between the traits and differences in neural reactivity when cognitive and emotional 
processing is taking place (DeYong 2010). At the other end of the causal process, studies have 
shown strong relationships between personality traits and important life outcomes such as self-
esteem and subjective well-being, spirituality and values, health and life expectancy, mental 
illness, peer and family relationships, romantic love, occupational choice, job performance and 
success, volunteerism and criminality (Ozer and Benet-Martinez 2006, Roberts et al. 2007). 
Personality Traits and Politics 
The literature on the relationship between the Big 5 personality traits and politics is 
dense, but clear in its conclusions. As Carney et al (2008: 815-6) put it, “a remarkable consensus 
[has emerged] over more than seven decades (and across numerous cultures and languages) that 
the two personality dimensions that should be most related to political orientation are openness 
to experience – consistently theorized to be higher among liberals – and conscientiousness – 
sometimes theorized to be higher among conservatives.” Other traits have played a relatively 
minor role, though they do figure in some studies. For example, Bakker et al. (2015a) found that 
while openness was a key explanation of who was likely to switch political parties from one 
election to another, extraversion might also play a (negative) role.    
In contrast to most of the existing literature, however, in this paper we focus not on 
conscientiousness and openness, but on agreeableness. As we discuss in the next section, 
although agreeableness has played an inconsistent role in the research on personality and politics, 
there are good reasons to expect it to be particularly important in authoritarian contexts. 
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Agreeableness 
Agreeableness is the personality factor primarily concerned with interpersonal 
relationships (Graziano and Tobin 2002) and is defined in terms of an underlying desire to 
maintain positive relations with others (Digman 1997, Graziano and Eisenberg 1997). As with 
the other personality traits, different kinds of language are used by different scholars to elucidate 
just what the pro-social trait of agreeableness entails, but Mondak (2010: 58) reports “virtually 
all scales used to represent agreeableness employ terms such as “warm”, “kind,” and 
“sympathetic.” This characterization of agreeableness would seem to link most obviously to 
social and economic liberalism and to general attitudes of tolerance and, indeed, there are many 
studies that support this idea. Highly agreeable people have been shown to engage more in a 
variety of behaviors such as sharing, donating, caring, comforting and helping (Caprara et al. 
2011). Highly agreeable people are more likely to contribute their time as volunteers (Carlo et al. 
2005) and are more likely to show “normative commitment” to a job or organization, due to an 
enhanced sense of social identity (Erdheim et al. 2006). 
However, research suggests that agreeableness is not just a placid state, but also involves 
“effortful control” of frustration (Ahadi and Rothbart 1994, Jensen-Campbell et al. 2002). Kieras 
et al. (2005) show that school-age children who score high on agreeableness exhibit less 
disappointment when receiving an unsatisfactory gift than other children. Similarly, Jensen-
Campbell and Graziano (2001) find that highly agreeable people process conflict differently, 
generating positive perceptions of what less agreeable people see as provocative behaviors 
(Jensen-Campbell and Graziano 2001). In looking at the relationship between agreeableness and 
social prejudices, Graziano et al. (2007) find that the pro-social desire to “get on” of agreeable 
people makes them act in less prejudiced ways and exhibit less racial bias. However, there is 
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evidence that this result derives more from an effort on the part of agreeable people to “suppress 
normatively inappropriate prejudices” rather than from simply being less prejudiced. The authors 
attribute lower levels of behavioral prejudice to the ability “to deploy attention strategically and 
to engage in positive interpersonal behaviors in the face of frustration” (Graziano et al. 2007; 
567) and find that highly agreeable people exhibit prejudice when given permission to do so by 
the context (Graziano et al. 2007).  
Despite the centrality of social approval and conflict management in the psychology 
literature on agreeableness (two elements one might think are important in politics), the political 
science literature has tended to see agreeableness as peripheral. Barbaranelli et al. (2007) found 
that agreeableness (along with openness) was associated with voting for the Democratic 
presidential nominee, John Kerry, in 2004, a finding consistent with previous research in Italy 
suggesting that higher agreeableness was associated with support for center-left  candidates 
(Caprara et al. 2006). Gerber et al. (2010), using very large samples (N=12,472), found evidence 
that agreeableness was positively associated with economic liberalism, but also with social 
conservatism, and not at all with ideology.  More recently, Bakker et al. (2015b) have shown that 
people low on agreeableness are more likely to support populist candidates or groups like the 
U.S. Tea Party, the Dutch Party for Freedom or the German Left Party. 
In perhaps the most comprehensive study to date, Mondak (2010) looked at a range of 
possible relationships between personality and politics in the United States. As with Gerber et 
al., the findings for openness and conscientiousness were strong and consistent, while those for 
the other traits were generally weak and variable. On agreeableness, Mondak found “sparse” 
results for the effect of agreeableness on political knowledge, attention and opinion, arguing that 
agreeableness might be “modestly depoliticizing” (Mondak 2010: 119). On political efficacy and 
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ideology he found no effect (Mondak 2010: 124-8). On partisanship, there was some evidence 
that agreeable Americans were more likely to be Democrats, but it was not possible to 
distinguish this effect from the effects of a particular political context (Mondak 2010: 132-4). 
Finally, there was weak evidence that agreeableness “may matter on the margins for moral 
traditionalism and moral judgment” (Mondak 2010: 135-8). Taken together, these studies 
suggest agreeableness is weakly and inconsistently associated with politics in democracies, in 
sharp contrast to what we see in authoritarian Russia. 
Agreeableness and Authoritarianism 
Given the nature of agreeableness as a trait, how it interacts with politics in authoritarian 
regimes is of particular interest. Authoritarian regimes, almost by definition, delegitimize 
difference and debate. While in democracies being critical of the head of state or government is 
generally seen as compatible with being a loyal citizen, in authoritarian regimes being critical 
can be dangerous. The degree to which this applies, of course, varies significantly across 
authoritarian regimes – publicly criticizing the government is a much more dangerous thing to do 
in North Korea, for example, than it is in contemporary Kazakhstan. However, even in those 
authoritarian contexts where expressing dissent is not particularly dangerous, loyalty to the state 
and the regime are inevitably mixed up in assessments of the incumbent administration. 
Consequently, being critical or supportive of the government has quite different social meaning 
that it does in a democracy.  
In a democracy, support for the incumbents is likely to be met with social approval in 
some contexts and disapproval in others. By contrast, in authoritarian regimes the sphere of 
legitimate and socially acceptable disagreement with incumbents is much smaller and, typically, 
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there is an active propaganda effort to make sure citizens are aware of these limits. To disagree is 
to actively invite conflict with accepted political norms in all but the most politically marginal of 
settings. Hence, people who are more strongly disposed towards social acceptance will be more 
reluctant to express oppositionist sentiment, while those who like to be different and stand out 
will tend to take oppositionist stands. This effect is likely to be even more important where the 
incumbents are able to equate support for them and their policies with patriotism. As a result, we 
would expect agreeableness to be both more important and more closely related to positive 
evaluations of the existing political regime and its policies and values than in democracies. 
There are also deeper reasons to expect that agreeableness will matter more in autocracies 
than in democracies. One of the pillars of democracy is a free press in which different viewpoints 
are accorded (at least in theory) equal legitimacy and state support. This is not the case in 
autocracies where there is typically a clear set of state-owned and/or state allied media outlets 
that support the personnel, policies and values of the regime. This is likely to be true even in 
those contexts in which non-official or even opposition news sources exist and are accessible. 
More agreeable people, valuing social acceptance more highly, are more likely to pay attention 
to such official sources than to opposition sources and so, consequently, they are more likely to 
be exposed to and accept official versions of events than less agreeable people. 
Furthermore, the case of the media is likely to be just one special case out of several 
“official” institutions that are state supported and follow the regime line. Such institutions are 
likely to vary across contexts, but might include churches, youth organizations and even social 
customs. It is plausible to think that more highly agreeable people may be more likely to 
participate in those officially sanctioned institutions, too, than less agreeable people (assuming 
some sort of choice is possible). If so, participation in state sponsored or state supporting 
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institutions will also serve to increase the importance of agreeableness as a factor in explaining 
patterns of support and opposition. 
Research Design 
In the rest of the paper, we investigate these claims using a two-stage strategy. First, we 
demonstrate the importance of personality traits in shaping support for the regime, orientations 
towards the leadership and views on a range of contemporary socio-economic and policy issues. 
We show the fundamental role of personality, and in particular agreeableness, even once we 
control for socio-economic and demographic factors generally thought to shape political 
opinions.  
In the second stage, we investigate the mechanisms through which personality influences 
political views. Taking the specific example of attitudes to gay rights, we show how personality 
“mediates” opinion through its effects on media choice, support for the president and religiosity. 
Case Selection: Authoritarianism and Personality in Russia 
We conduct our analysis using data from Russia. As noted above, research suggests that 
the particularities of context are likely to be important in shaping the relationship between 
personality and politics (Mondak et al. 2010). Consequently, it is important to reflect on what 
might be specific about the Russian experience and what might be more general. In this section, 
we identify three factors that might shape how Russians interact with their political environment 
and may be consequential for our results – the nature of the political regime, the structure of the 
economy, and the role of ideology and nationalism in politics. 
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After a period of relative political liberalization in the decade following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, Russia appeared by the mid-2000s to have consolidated as a hybrid 
authoritarian state, in which a carefully curated political space allowed for multi-party elections, 
a modicum of opposition and a degree of open political debate (Colton and Hale 2009). While 
precise levels of support for President Vladimir Putin, his proxy Dmitry Medvedev, and their 
ruling United Russia party fluctuated, the regime was bolstered throughout most of the decade by 
robust economic growth, rising standards of living and general feelings of personal and national 
wellbeing. 
That changed in December 2011. In parliamentary elections, the ruling United Russia 
party garnered only 49.3 percent of the officially reported vote, a 15-percentage point drop from 
their previous result. To make matters worse, a series of protests in Moscow and other big cities 
brought hundreds of thousands of people out to the streets alleging widespread electoral fraud. 
The Kremlin responded with a significant shift in rhetoric, accusing the protestors and opposition 
leaders of being a Western-backed fifth column, accentuating wedge issues such as 
homosexuality, the Orthodox Church and a supposed foreign threat to Russia’s sovereignty, and 
mobilizing around a conservative, ‘us vs them’ political narrative. This discursive shift was 
reinforced after Putin’s reelection in March 2012, supplemented by much heavier reliance on 
arrests, trials and judicial persecution than before (Greene 2014). This is the political context in 
which we conducted our survey. 
Nevertheless, as much as they may have been affected by current developments, our 
respondents are also bearers of much more deeply rooted traditions, practices and habits of 
political behavior. Some 48 percent of our respondents are over 40, meaning that many were 
politically socialized in the USSR. Moreover, even those who are too young to remember that 
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era are likely to have been influenced politically to some degree by Russia’s long historical 
experience with dictatorship and absolutism. It is not clear, therefore, how to weight the impact 
of the contemporary political environment and the legacies of the Soviet experience. To the 
extent that what we find is the result of the contemporary context, the Russian results are likely 
to be generalizable across a range of authoritarian regimes to which the contemporary Russian 
regime bears a family resemblance. By contrast, to the extent that what we are picking up the 
legacies of Soviet history, the universe of comparative cases may be more limited. 
A second factor that makes Russia look more similar to some contemporary authoritarian 
regimes is the structure of the economy. The Russian middle class – which is over-represented in 
our sample by design, and which was over-represented in the 2011-12 protest movement by most 
accounts –is heavily dependent upon the state (Gontmakher and Ross 2015). McMann (2006) has 
described at length the mechanisms that discourage political activism amongst Russian citizens 
who are directly or indirectly dependent on the state, and some 45 percent of our sample reported 
working in the state sector. In addition, independent election observers have repeatedly reported 
that state employees are expected (and often coerced) into voting for the ruling party and its 
candidates (Panfilova and Sheverdiaev 2005). Thus, it may be that our results are more relevant 
to the (relatively common) situation in which an authoritarian state plays a major role in the 
economy. 
Third, Russian politics are weakly ideologized but heavily influenced by nationalism. 
Ideology has not been found to shape citizens’ party affiliations (Hanson 2010) or vote choice 
(Hale 2008), supplanted by “effective calculations of their costs and benefits and risk-aversion 
under conditions of uncertainty” (Gel’man 2015; 35). Citizens, in turn, learned to mistrust 
ideological debate and politicians who cloaked themselves in ideological trappings (Clement 
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2013). The only thing that comes close to a broadly accepted ideology is the idea of Russia’s and 
Russians’ “uniqueness” (Dubin 2011; 225). This differentiation of the unique Russian ‘us’ from 
the universal, non-Russian ‘other’ has the unavoidable effect of suppressing any divisions among 
‘us’; individuals who accept the idea of Russian uniqueness are thus incentivized to be just like 
everyone else. To illustrate this effect, recent focus group research into how young Russians 
process political information received through online social media, finds that having an 
“‘opinion corresponding to the majority’” is a critical marker of trustworthiness; Russians seek 
out (and reproduce) ideational conformity not to reinforce their own views, but for “avoidance of 
risk and ‘betrayal’” (Mickiewicz 2014; 88-89).  
The extent to which each of these factors shapes the results that follow will only be clear 
with future research in other contexts. Many contemporary authoritarian regimes are marked by 
sharp “us vs. them” rhetoric, large state sectors, and de-ideologized and nationalistic politics. 
However, states inevitably vary in the degree to which each of these elements is present and 
future research will be needed to uncover the extent to which our findings generalize beyond 
Russia. 
Data Collection 
Our data collection took place in October 2013, one month after mayoral elections in 
Moscow, Ekaterinburg and a number of other cities. The survey included Moscow and 
respondents from all thirteen cities in Russia with a population of more than 1 million people.  
The survey was conducted online and focused on a key political demographic in 
Russia—educated, upper-income, Internet-using urbanites. The target sample was designed to 
represent upper- and middle-income Internet users between 16 and 65 years old, with some 
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higher education and who live in cities with a population of more than 1 million.  Invitations 
were stratified on age and gender based on Internet penetration data. Respondents were screened 
on the basis of education, city of residence and income, with only those who said they could at 
least afford food and clothes being surveyed.  About 1200 respondents completed the full 
questionnaire.1 
The sampling strategy we adopted offers a number of significant advantages over a 
classic nationally representative sample. In order to learn about a relatively small group such as 
supporters of the Russian opposition, we need a tailored sample that provides significant 
numbers of people willing to oppose the incumbent regime (and admit to it). While broad 
national surveys indicate some level of opposition, the population sampled here demonstrates 
considerably higher levels. This is important because the more balanced distribution of opinion 
in this group means we can expect more meaningful answers to survey questions and greater 
statistical power.  
Clearly, however, this advantage is also potentially a drawback -- the specific distribution 
of attitudes and opinions we find are not representative of patterns in the population as a whole. 
This non-representativeness would be a problem if we were trying to estimate mean levels of key 
variables in the population. Fortunately, we are not. Instead, we are interested in the inter-
relationships between personality measures and political variables, and there is no reason to 
believe that the range restriction in our sample would either flip the relationships of interest or so 
severely curtail variation as to radically change the size of the coefficients of interest. As the 
descriptive statistics in Supplementary Appendix B demonstrate, there is ample variation within 
																																								 																				
1 For more details on recruitment see Supplementary Appendix B. 
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our sample on all the personality variables.  
 
Measuring Personality 
There are many different approaches to measuring traits in personality psychology. In 
particular, approaches vary enormously in the number of questions used to measure traits 
(Gerber et al. 2011a: 267). Many studies include up to twenty questions per trait in order to 
maximize the internal validity of the measures. In our study we followed Gerber et al. (2010, 
2011a, 2011b) in using the simple standard Ten-Item Personality Inventory (TIPI) of Gosling, 
Rentfrow and Swann (2003). Respondents were asked, “Here is a list of characteristics that a 
person might have. For each of them, please tell us the extent to which each describes or does not 
describe you personally”. As in the standard TIPI, respondents were offered a seven-point scale 
and the following traits: 
Openness – “open to new experiences, complex”; “conventional, uncreative” 
Conscientiousness – “dependable, self-disciplined”; “disorganized, careless” 
Extraversion – “extraverted and enthusiastic”; “reserved and quiet” 
Agreeableness – “sympathetic, warm”; “critical and quarrelsome” 
Neuroticism – “calm, emotionally stable”; “anxious, easily upset” 
The TIPI approach is extremely useful for political science applications where surveys 
include many questions on issues other than personality, and so brevity is important. Despite 
being short, the TIPI scale correlates well with longer batteries of personality questions (Gosling, 
Rentfrow and Swann 2003). Moreover, while the TIPI is clearly quite crude, Carney et al. (2008) 
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examined a range of more subtle measures designed to address the possibility that liberals and 
conservatives might present themselves to the world differently, and their findings confirmed 
much of the existing literature. Gerber et al. (2011a) compared the TIPI with the longer (44 
items) Big Five Inventory (BFI) (John et al. 2008) and found “little evidence that the choice of 
personality battery is particularly consequential in models predicting political attitudes” though 
for political interest and turnout there was variation between the two measures across all five 
traits (Gerber et al. 2011a; 280-2). Given that we are primarily interested here in attitudes, these 
results are reassuring. 
Another key reason for using the TIPI measure was that since we were working in a new 
context, it was important to use a well-known and widely validated battery of personality 
questions to maximize the degree to which our findings would be comparable to the existing 
literature. Thus, rather than developing our own battery as some scholars have done (Anderson 
2009, Mondak et al. 2010), we translated an existing measure that has been used in a number of 
very prominent studies in political science (Gerber et al. 2010, 2011a, 2011b) and in hundreds 
more studies by personality psychologists. At the time of writing this article, the TIPI has been 
cited some 3000 times.2 Nevertheless, this approach still raises the issue of translating the TIPI 
into Russian. Since there is no standard Russian language TIPI , we made our own translation in 
consultation with native speakers with decades of experience of survey research in Russia (see 
the Supplementary Appendix D).  
																																								 																				
2 For a partial list of studies using the TIPI see http://gosling.psy.utexas.edu/scales-weve-
developed/ten-item-personality-measure-tipi/tipi-references/ 
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A common criticism of the TIPI scale is that the Cronbach alpha typically used to 
measure the internal validity of an index is low for measures of traits produced by the TIPI. Our 
study is no exception (see Supplementary Appendix C). However, this criticism is to a 
significant extent misdirected in the current context. As Gosling notes, the TIPI was designed to 
capture broad personality traits using only two questions and so should not generate high alpha 
scores – if it did, the measure would only be measuring one facet of the trait.3  
Nevertheless, some shortcomings are inevitable when we are forced to use a short 
personality inventory like the TIPI. As Crede et al (2012) point out, short inventories are 
inevitably more subject to the effect of random measurement error and have less content validity 
than longer inventories that can explore the multiple facets of the Big Five. However, the 
principal effects of this error are to understate the importance of personality traits both through 
Type 2 errors on the personality variables and Type 1 errors on other variables resulting from the 
decreased amount of initial variance explained by the shortened Big Five measures (Crede et al. 
2012: 876-7). Given these different measurement issues, which arise at least to some degree in 
all work on personality and politics, certainty about the validity of our results will require 
replication using different approaches to personality measurement. Nevertheless, as we show 
below, our results are remarkably consistent, which adds to confidence in the findings. 
																																								 																				
3 For more details see Supplementary Appendix C. See also http://gosling.psy.utexas.edu/scales-
weve-developed/ten-item-personality-measure-tipi/a-note-on-alpha-reliability-and-factor-
structure-in-the-tipi/ 
	
	
19	
	
Dependent Variables 
Our principal theoretical concern in this paper is how different personality traits relate to 
support for an authoritarian regime and its policies and values. We measure the general notion of 
“support” in three different ways: presidential approval, voting behavior and emotional 
orientation toward the regime. Each of these gets at increasingly deep notions of support for the 
authoritarian regime in place in Russia on October 2013 when the survey took place. 
The most straightforward measure of support – and the most followed indicator in Russia 
and elsewhere – is a simple measure of approval of the president. To capture this, we used the 
wording that the leading independent polling firm in Russia, Levada, has been using in its 
monthly tracking of presidential approval for the last decade. The question asks, “Overall do you 
approve or disapprove of the work of Vladimir Putin as President of Russia?” Respondents have 
five options – fully approve, rather approve, rather disapprove, fully disapprove, and hard to say. 
Our second measure of support is the response to the question of whether the respondent 
voted in the 2012 presidential election and, if so, for whom. In the analysis here we use a dummy 
variable to indicate whether the respondent voted for Vladimir Putin or not. While presidential 
election voting is clearly the most important part of voting behavior, the question used here relies 
on recall and is also only one of the ways of voting “for” the regime. In Supplementary 
Appendix A we show that the main results hold for other measures of voting for the regime – 
voting for United Russia in the Duma elections and answering hypothetical questions about 
future voting intentions. 
The next dependent variable focuses on a deeper sense of relationship with the regime 
than approval or voting – emotional connection. Following Tausch et al. (2011), we looked at the 
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emotion of contempt toward the “leadership”, asking the degree to which respondents would 
agree that they despised Russia’s leaders. There are vigorous debates about the role of different 
kinds of negative emotions in politics, but “contempt” is thought to contrast with anger and to 
lead to either withdrawal from politics or to non-normative actions designed to “remove” the 
object of contempt (Tausch et al. 2011:131-2). In this paper, what matters are not the specific 
consequences of the emotion, but that contempt is considered to be an important emotional 
orientation with political consequences.  
Beyond support for the regime and emotions, we looked at measures of both economic 
and social liberalism to test the extent to which the findings of the existing literature hold up in 
the context of educated, urban Russians in 2013. On economic liberalism, we asked respondents 
how important it was (on a 5 point scale) that there should be an equal distribution of income in 
the country. For social values, we focused on two issues that were very hot topics of political 
conversation in the fall of 2013: gay rights and migration. Each of these issues is of particular 
interest because they have a clear liberal/conservative dimension and they were very centrally at 
play in the politics of the country at the time. Moreover, since most of the literature suggests that 
highly agreeable people are more tolerant, these variables represent a key test of the argument 
that this relationship changes where intolerance is actively propagated by the state. 
On gay rights, we asked how people felt about a new law that provided major fines for 
those convicted of “propaganda” for “non-traditional” sexual relationships (same 5 point scale). 
We also asked the extent to which people agreed that the government should take measures to 
remove most immigrants from the country (same scale). Finally, we asked how important it was 
to have strong military and police forces in the country (same scale), a question that we expect 
would tap very directly into a liberal/conservative dimension. 
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Alternative Explanations and Control Variables 
In the analysis we control for a number of other factors that have been commonly used in 
the literature to explain variations in public opinion in Russia. Since we might expect state and 
private sector workers to have different views, we use a dummy variable (Private Employment) 
to indicate whether a respondent works in the private sector. We control for family income using 
the screener question described above. We use a simple three-category variable to measure 
whether the economic circumstances of the respondent’s family have gotten worse, stayed the 
same or improved over the last year (Family Economy) and a dummy for whether the respondent 
lives in Moscow or not. Education is measured in three categories – some higher education, 
complete higher education and advanced degree. Since women and younger people have 
typically been found to be more anti-western and supportive of the regime, we also control for 
gender and age.4  
We also consider a prominent alternative approach to thinking about the relationship 
between personality and politics – the literature on authoritarian personalities. While early 
approaches derived from Adorno were founded on a conception of personality that was heavily 
criticized on both conceptual and empirical grounds (Jost et al. 2003), subsequent work has made 
real progress. Prominent work on authoritarianism includes the prodigious research of Altemeyer 
(1981) on Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA), Stenner (2005) on the interaction of 
authoritarian personality with the experience of threat and Pratto et al. (1994) on Social 
Dominance Orientation (SDO). 
While there is debate over whether authoritarianism is a trait in itself or is derived from 
																																								 																				
4 Colton and Hale 2009; Mendelson and Gerber 2008.  
	
	
22	
	
something deeper such as the Big Five, most of the existing research finds authoritarianism to be 
related to conservative political attitudes.  As such, we would expect that authoritarianism might 
play a similar role to conscientiousness in predicting conservative political and social attitudes. 
There may also be a negative relationship to openness and agreeableness (Aichholzer and 
Zandonella 2016) or even all Big Five traits except neuroticism (Ekehammar et al. 2004).  
A separate issue in the authoritarianism literature is whether the trait is measurable 
separate from the attitudes it is used to predict. Hetherington and Weiler (2009) resolve this issue 
by focusing not on political attitudes but instead on values related to child rearing which, they 
argue, allow researchers to assess the degree of authoritarianism independent of politics and then 
make arguments connecting the two. In our analysis, we construct a measure of authoritarianism 
using the same child-rearing questions as Hetherington and Weiler and use it as a control in our 
regressions. 
Finally, since at least the 1950s, personality researchers have recognized the tendency of 
some people to say yes to questions at higher rates than others. The possibility of such “response 
set” bias raises questions about the measurement of personality itself (Erdle and Rushton 2010) 
and about the relationship between personality and outcomes of interest, such as the political 
attitudes we focus on here. To address this issue we follow convention in the TIPI by asking 
respondents to agree/disagree to descriptions that are at opposite ends of the scale (e.g. 
“sympathetic, warm” and “critical and quarrelsome”).  
However, since our focus here is on agreeableness, readers might wonder the extent to 
which our results are the product of a tendency to agree with questions (acquiescence bias) rather 
than a function of connections between agreeableness and the substantive issue at stake. To 
address this concern, we take a number of precautions. First, we include a dependent variable 
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capturing voting behavior that requires respondents to pick a name from a list, rather than to 
agree or disagree with a proposition. Second, our questions about emotional attachments refer to 
negative rather than positive emotions towards the regime, separating out a simple tendency to 
agree with questions from the substance of those questions. Third, in asking questions about 
immigrants and gays, agreeing with the question requires respondents to express negative 
attitudes towards a social group. Finally, we construct an index of the general tendency of 
respondents to be “yea-sayers” using questions in our survey other than those central to our 
analysis and show that our results are robust to including this index.5 
Personality and Support for the Regime 
Table 1 presents the results looking at voting, approval and emotions. In the case of 
presidential vote choice (models 1-3) we use a simple logit model to distinguish Putin voters 
from others. Models 4-9 use ordered logit models. The table presents odds ratios with z statistics 
in parentheses.  
* Table 1 about here * 
Model 1 looks at the effect of the Big Five without controls on the likelihood of voting 
for President Putin in 2012. The results show that personality type plays a major role in helping 
us understand why some educated urbanites support the Putin regime and others do not, but that 
the patterns are different from what we might expect based on the literature in democracies. As 
we hypothesized, more agreeable people were more likely to vote for President Putin than people 
who are low on agreeableness. This finding would be quite unexpected from the existing 
																																								 																				
5 See Supplementary Appendix E for details. 
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literature on personality and politics, though it is consistent with the framework we outlined 
above. Model 1 also suggests that conscientiousness – the trait associated with attention to detail 
and self-discipline – is positively associated with approval of President Putin. This is in line with 
the existing literature that would lead us to expect conscientiousness to be associated with 
conservatism. However, openness to experience, the liberal counterpart to conscientiousness in 
the democracies literature, has no effect.  
In Models 2 and 3, we add the control variables.  Model 2 includes the effect of 
authoritarianism, which has the expected sign – more authoritarian people have a higher 
probability of voting for Putin – but it is not statistically significant at conventional levels. 
Adding the full battery of controls described above, the effect of agreeableness holds, but the 
effect of conscientiousness does not. With the full set of controls, authoritarianism becomes 
significant at the .05 level. 
Adding controls confirms the view in the literature that voting for Putin is very closely 
tied to economics (Treisman 2011). People whose family economic situation had improved over 
the preceding year are more likely to approve of the president and people whose economic 
fortunes have declined are less likely to approve. Also consistent with what we already know 
about voting behavior in Russia, being older is associated with voting for Putin. The effect of 
working in the public sector as opposed to private sector is positive, though only marginally 
significant.  
* Figure 1 about here * 
Although there are some complexities in comparing across independent variables that are 
measured on different scales, Figure 1 gives us a sense of the size of the effects, by showing how 
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the probability voting for President Putin in 2012 changes with shifts in the substantively most 
important independent variables, holding other variables fixed at their means. The figure shows 
the effect of moving from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation 
above in the score of conscientiousness, agreeableness, authoritarianism and age, from a 
worsening family economic situation to an improving one and in moving from public sector 
employment to private. Amongst all the variables that affect the likelihood of voting for 
President Putin, agreeableness has some of the largest effects, increasing the likelihood of voting 
for Putin from .25 to .38, a more than 50 percent increase in probability. The effect is 
comparable to a change in age from 27 years old to 52 years, or from reporting that one’s family 
income worsened in the last year to reporting that it improved. The effects of the other 
personality variables are somewhat smaller. A two standard deviation change in 
conscientiousness increases the likelihood of voting for Putin by 6 percentage points and a 
similar change in the authoritarianism scale increases the probability by 7 percentage points.  
Models 4 to 6 show the results of ordered logit models (on a four-point scale) looking at 
the effects of personality on approval of President Putin. Again, agreeableness, with or without 
controls, stands out as highly significant and substantively important. More agreeable people are 
more likely to approve of Putin. Conscientious again matters (models 4 and 6), though its effect 
is somewhat reduced by the inclusion of authoritarianism (model 5), which also impacts approval 
of the president. Interestingly, neuroticism also matters, with respondents who score higher on 
neuroticism being less likely to approve of the president. The control variables behave similarly 
on approval as they do on voting.  
 Models 7 to 9 show that the results of looking at the third dependent variable, emotions, 
are very similar to approval and voting. The regression models are ordered logit models, this 
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time on a seven-point scale, examining the intensity of feeling of emotions toward the leadership. 
We find that agreeableness is significantly and negatively associated with contempt. The 
findings on contempt are important in themselves but are also useful because they demonstrate 
that our strong and consistent agreeableness results are not driven by a tendency for agreeable 
people simply to agree with the framing of the question at a higher rate. In models 7-9, more 
agreeable respondents are more likely to disagree with the statement that they despise Russia’s 
leaders. Neuroticism, as before, was positively associated with contempt for the leadership. Once 
again, openness and extraversion seem to have no effect. 
Personality and Economic and Social Liberalism 
 In this section we look at the relationship between personality, issues and values. We 
deliberately selected values and issues that had a clear liberal/conservative dimension to them, so 
that we could compare our findings with existing comparative research. Moreover, we looked for 
issues that would reflect both economic (Table 2 Models 1 and 2) and social (Table 2 Models 3-
8) liberalism and conservatism (Gerber et al. 2010).  
* Table 2 about here * 
In Model 1 we find that support for economic redistribution is shaped only by 
agreeableness, even when we include our battery of controls (Model 2). Interestingly––and 
contrary to our expectations – more conscientious and more open Russians do not differ 
systematically in their attitude to economic redistribution, quite unlike Americans (Gerber et al. 
2010). On social issues, once again agreeableness plays the biggest role in shaping views on each 
issue, but the effect is not in the direction of tolerance. Instead, consistent with experimental 
studies on agreeableness (Graziano et al. 2007; 567), in a context where the media are 
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aggressively pushing anti-gay legislation (Models 3 and 4) and where anti-immigrant attitudes 
are common (73 percent of respondents showed some support for deporting immigrants), more 
agreeable people are more likely to share intolerant attitudes (Models 5 and 6). More agreeable 
people are also more likely to support a strong military and police, even if it means trading off 
freedom (Models 7 and 8).  
The results on conscientiousness look more like the existing literature. Conscientious 
people are more likely to support anti-gay legislation and to favor a strong military and police. 
There is also some weaker support for the notion that more conscientious people are more likely 
to be in favor of deporting all immigrants. Interestingly there is no effect of conscientiousness on 
redistribution, an issue that is not emphasized by the incumbent regime in Russia.   
While none of the other Big Five traits seem to matter for explaining variation in the 
degree of social and economic liberalism, authoritarianism is associated with more conservative 
positions on the social issues of gay rights, immigration and the military, but also, like 
agreeableness, with support for economic redistribution. This correlation of social conservatism 
and support for redistribution is a well-known feature of post-Communist politics more generally 
(Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2014).  
How Agreeableness Shapes Attitudes 
While we have demonstrated the importance of personality in general and agreeableness 
in particular in shaping support for the regime and positions on important issues, we have not yet 
shown evidence of how personality comes to matter. Though we know an increasing amount 
about the correlates of agreeableness, there is little agreement theoretically on the mechanism by 
which agreeableness (or any other personality trait) is related to social attitudes. Approaches 
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range from those that focus on the specifics of how the person and the situation interact to the 
more ambitious “whole trait theory,” which posits that a complete account of traits requires an 
explanation of the emergence of traits from social-cognitive mechanisms (Fleeson and 
Jayawickreme 2015). While there is no space here to pursue a full review of different 
approaches, in this section we present preliminary evidence on one key mechanism – mediation.6  
One way to think of how personality shapes outcomes is to think of traits as shaping a 
person’s interaction with their environment, which in turn shapes the outcome of interest. Here 
the model is trait – mediator – outcome (McKinnon et al 2007). Using such a mediation model, 
researchers have shown, for example, that personality has large effects on morbidity and 
mortality, as personality affects smoking, alcohol use and risk-taking behavior, which in turn 
affect life span (Martin et al. 2007).  
To examine mediation in the context of political and social attitudes, we look at the 
process by which agreeableness shapes attitudes toward anti-gay legislation in Russian. The gay 
rights question is a particularly interesting and useful issue to study for a number of reasons. 
First, this issue was not politically prominent before it was picked up by the Kremlin in 2012 as a 
strategic wedge issue employed to solidify support versus an emergent opposition (Smyth and 
Soboleva 2014). Moreover, existing personality psychology literature suggests that more 
agreeable people should be less prejudiced (Sibley and Duckitt 2008). However, as we saw in 
Table 2, in Russia people who scored higher on agreeableness were in fact more (not less) likely 
																																								 																				
6 In Supplementary Appendix G we present results on another mechanism – moderation – that 
we show is far less important in this context. 
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to support legislation intended to persecute gays and lesbians. As such, the issue sheds light on 
how politicization shapes the interaction between personality traits and politics. From our 
theoretical discussion, we expect context to shape interaction in at least three ways – selection of 
information sources, respect for Presidential positions and relationship with official institutions. 
We look at each of these in turn.  
First, to investigate the relationship between attitudes and information sources, we look at 
habits of consumption of political news, focusing on the highly propagandistic state television 
and on a key source of opposition news and discussion, the blogging site Live Journal (Koltsova 
and Shcherbak 2015). Respondents reported whether they used state television “to get political 
news and information” daily, a few times a week, a few times a month, rarely or never. 
Respondents were also asked if they subscribed to Live Journal. 
Second, we consider the issue of general approval of the Putin regime. We think that this 
is likely to mediate attitudes towards anti-gay legislation (rather than the other way around), 
precisely because of the political novelty of anti-gay legislation in Russia. While it is possible 
that some people had strongly formed opinions on the “threat” posed by gay people, they are 
likely to be largely outnumbered by those inclined to accept that a threat exists and requires 
legislation because they trust Putin and his administration. Third, we consider the mediating 
effect of religiosity. Much of the impetus for anti-gay legislation, first in Russia’s regions, then 
in the national parliament, has come from politicians claiming to be staunch supporters of 
Orthodoxy, and the Orthodox Church leadership itself has played a major role in mobilizing its 
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adherents against gays and lesbians.7 To measure religiosity, we asked respondents how 
important Orthodoxy (the dominant religion in Russia) was to them personally, using a five-point 
scale.  
In recent years there has been much discussion about the methodological challenges of 
causal identification in mediation models (Imai et al. 2010, Imai et al. 2011). Hicks and Tingley 
(2011) identify two key practical problems with the method of estimating mediation effects that 
is most commonly used in personality psychology (Baron and Kenny 1986)  – the problem of 
extending to non-linear models and the inability to analyze the sensitivity of results to violations 
in a key assumption, known as sequential ignorability. To address these issues we use the 
mediation software for Stata developed by Hicks and Tingley (2011). Our state television and 
religion mediators are measured on a five point scale and Putin approval on a four point scale, so 
we are able to treat them as approximately continuous and use OLS regressions. For these 
mediators the results are equivalent to those of using the traditional product of coefficients 
approach. For the binary Live Journal variable we estimate a probit model in the mediation 
equation. In addition to allowing the use of a binary mediator, the software allows us to illustrate 
the sensitivity of the results to violations of the identification assumptions underlying the 
analysis. The results of the sensitivity analysis are in Supplementary Appendix D. 
We estimated four mediation models using the full battery of controls. The idea is to 
estimate a predicted value of the mediator at minimum and maximum values of agreeableness 
(the treatment variable). These predicted values are then used in estimating support for anti-gay 
																																								 																				
7 https://www.ncronline.org/blogs/grace-margins/orthodox-church-s-role-russia-s-anti-gay-laws. 
Last accessed July 1, 2016 
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legislation (the outcome variable) to give average causal mediation effect and the direct effect. It 
is not currently possible to calculate meaningful estimates of multiple treatment variables at the 
same time and provide simple results, so we ran each of the mediation models separately. 
Although the mediation analysis presented here cannot be conclusive, it is highly suggestive of 
the importance of context in shaping the effects of personality traits. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
The results are shown in Table 3. The total unmediated effect of agreeableness on support 
for anti-gay legislation is positive, statistically significant and about the same size in each model. 
However, once we include mediators – the effect of agreeableness on media choice (watching 
state television and using Live Journal), on general orientation toward President Putin and on the 
degree of commitment to the Orthodox Church – the substantive argument changes somewhat. 
Agreeableness does matter for support for anti-gay legislation, but not simply because highly 
agreeable people in Russia are more willing to express support for official homophobia. Instead, 
much of the connection between agreeableness and support for anti-gay legislation comes 
indirectly. Agreeable people are more likely to watch state television, less likely to use 
LiveJournal for news, are more likely to approve of Putin and are more committed to the 
Orthodox Church. All of these factors are in turn significantly connected to attitudes to anti-gay 
legislation – state television watchers, those who approve more of Putin and Orthodox believers 
are all more supportive of homophobic legislation, while LiveJournal subscribers are less 
supportive. Table 3 summarizes the direct and indirect effects. Since Table 3 presents the results 
of each mediator separately it is necessarily a simplified version of the true underlying process. 
Nevertheless, the results show large indirect effects with as much as 22 percent of the effect of 
agreeableness being mediated through choices about state television, 13 percent through reading 
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Live Journal, 20 percent through attitudes toward the president and 29 percent through attitudes 
to the state religion, Orthodoxy. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
The mediation analysis illustrates the importance of context in shaping the effects of 
personality traits. Specifically, attitudes to anti-gay legislation are to a large degree a function of 
attention to the media and official institutions. This result echoes Mondak and Hibbing’s (2015) 
findings in the United States. However, that the effect is largely indirect does not mean that 
agreeableness is not important – quite the contrary. Many scholars have pointed to a key role for 
state media in Russia and other authoritarian regimes amongst those people who choose to pay 
attention to it (Enikolopov et al. 2011), though of course not all do. Agreeableness, it seems, is 
one important factor that helps us to understand why some people pay attention to the state 
media and some do not. Agreeableness also helps to explain why some read opposition 
information sources and others do not. Moreover, agreeableness shapes attitudes to other key 
official institutions through which support is channeled, including the presidency and the church, 
and so is fundamental to shaping the attitudes of citizens to the regime and its projects. 
Consequently, as other research on personality and politics suggests, the relationship between 
traits and the content of attitudes is not necessary but contingent. It is the content of the media 
and the policy prescriptions of the state institutions that in turn shape specific attitudes. This is 
likely to be particularly true of agreeableness, which, as previous experimental work suggests 
(Graziano et al. 2007), is itself a measure of responsiveness of the individual to cues given by the 
external environment. 
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Conclusion 
Our results point to an important role for the personality trait of agreeableness in shaping 
support for incumbent leaders, in mitigating negative emotional responses to the regime, and in 
creating pro-regime political values in Russia. The findings are particularly interesting when 
contrasted with the existing literature on personality and politics. In democracies, 
conscientiousness and openness play a leading role in explaining political attitudes and affinities, 
while agreeableness is a largely peripheral personality trait. By contrast, in Russia agreeableness 
is central.  
In addition to showing the broad political significance of agreeableness, we used the issue 
of support for anti-gay legislation to trace the pathways through which agreeableness creates its 
effects. We presented evidence that agreeableness works to a substantial degree indirectly, by 
shaping basic behaviors such as media consumption and deeper orientations towards the regime 
or religion. These institutions in turn shape understandings about what is “normal” and what is 
“deviant” and serve to attach agreeableness to conservative social values – promoting support for 
laws punishing homosexuals. This finding is also interesting in the light of Bakker et al. (2015b), 
who show that people low in agreeableness tend to support populist outsiders challenging the 
liberal status quo in the United States, the Netherlands and Germany. While those populists, 
especially in the case of conservative populists, are often supporting a similar social policy 
agenda to that of Russia’s current leadership, agreeableness has opposite effects because of the 
switch in which positions the mainstream establishment supports. Were the political 
establishment and its institutions to become attached to a different set of issues and orientations, 
our analysis suggests that agreeable Russian citizens would come to support those orientations 
instead. 
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This paper represents a first assessment of the importance of personality traits in shaping 
support for or opposition to authoritarian regimes and opens as many questions as it answers. 
Most obvious is the question of how the results in Russia travel to different authoritarian 
contexts. In this study, we find patterns that are quite different from the existing literature and we 
have made an argument about why we think this difference is best explained by the mobilizing 
authoritarian political context in Russia. This context is one of a largely non-ideological, non-
ethnic, patriotic form of authoritarianism, which invites all but a tightly defined group of 
“deviants” and “foreign agents” to be supporters of the regime. Whether the relationships we 
find in Russia will hold in more ideological or ethnically based dictatorships, further research 
will tell. 
 It could, of course, be objected that what we found are differences between Russians and 
the other kinds of people studied in the psychology literature, rather than between democracies 
and authoritarian regimes. We have made what we think are sound theoretical arguments for the 
difference being regime type rather than nationality. Nevertheless, without data from other 
authoritarian countries, we can neither rule out a cultural element to the story, nor be sure of how 
the role of traits actually varies across authoritarian regimes. Conducting such research in other 
authoritarian states represents an important new research agenda that this paper opens up. 
Beyond the literature on personality, our findings are highly relevant for scholars 
interested in authoritarian regimes and democratization more broadly. While we still understand 
little about personality traits and regime dynamics, it is fascinating to see the crucial role played 
by agreeableness in support for regime policies and positions. These findings point to the 
importance of the appearance of social unanimity in maintaining authoritarianism, a factor first 
discussed in detail by Vaclav Havel in his famous essay, The Power of the Powerless (1985). 
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Most people, as Havel pointed out, are willing to continue to participate in the “lies” of a regime 
while they think that others will too. However, this reliance on social conformity is both a 
strength and a weakness, as Havel argued. When unanimity breaks down and alternative 
positions become socially acceptable, regimes can dissolve very quickly.   
A similar story, in a very different style, is told by Kuran (1991) in explaining how 
cascades of defections from authoritarianism – revolutions – generally are surprising to 
observers. Kuran, however, relies on an exogenously generated individual “internal cost of 
preference falsification” or “revolutionary threshold”. Our approach has two key advantages 
compared with this. First, our analysis is based on well-established theories of human 
psychology and can explain changes in behavior and attitudes without resort to preference 
falsification. If agreeableness is an important factor underlying commitment to authoritarian 
leaders and their projects, then one would expect to see similar switching dynamics as 
estimations of the political winds change. Second, Kuran’s “revolutionary threshold” is by 
definition unobservable, while we have the tools to measure agreeableness and associated 
attitudes. This means we have at least the possibility of watching in real time how well a given 
regime is maintaining its mass support basis and when that support is in danger of crumbling. 
While the connection to Havel and Kuran is enticing, we do not yet know the extent to 
which our findings are general. A key issue in this regard is that our arguments and data suggest 
that highly agreeable people, on average, respond to the social incentives created by the state, the 
state media and state sponsored institutions, as opposed to other potential sources of social 
approbation such as the family or friend groups. Based on our experience in Russia, this sounds 
very plausible. However, the extent to which such a focus on the state is replicated in other 
regimes is very much a new question. It might be the case that family networks in places like 
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Pinochet’s Chile were more important, and so agreeableness plays less of a role in the selection 
of media and institutions and thus has a weaker influence on attitudes towards the regime and its 
projects. Looking at how social context might vary across different authoritarian regimes is 
another important line of research that our findings help to open.  
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Table 1 Personality Traits and Orientations towards Russia’s Leadership in October 2013 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Putin 
Voter 
Logit 
Putin 
Voter 
Logit 
Putin 
Voter 
Logit 
Putin 
Approval 
Ordered 
Logit 
Putin 
Approval 
Ordered 
Logit 
Putin 
Approval 
Ordered 
Logit 
Despise 
Leader 
Ordered 
Logit 
Despise 
Leader 
Ordered 
Logit 
Despise 
Leader 
Ordered 
Logit 
          
Conscientiousness 2.41* 2.32* 2.23 2.09* 1.89 2.98* 0.25** 0.26** 0.34** 
 (2.16) (2.06) (1.58) (2.08) (1.79) (2.51) (-4.19) (-4.15) (-2.65) 
Openness 1.12 1.22 0.85 0.84 0.97 0.94 1.44 1.39 1.26 
 (0.27) (0.46) (-0.32) (-0.48) (-0.07) (-0.13) (1.06) (0.95) (0.56) 
Agreeableness 4.90** 4.71** 7.16** 7.03** 6.47** 4.69** 0.26** 0.26** 0.31** 
 (3.66) (3.55) (3.63) (4.98) (4.75) (3.34) (-3.76) (-3.67) (-2.74) 
Neuroticism 0.77 0.75 0.99 0.33** 0.32** 0.39* 2.30** 2.31** 2.15* 
 (-0.73) (-0.79) (-0.02) (-3.43) (-3.54) (-2.38) (2.76) (2.78) (2.06) 
Extraversion 0.90 0.91 0.59 1.17 1.14 0.63 1.40 1.40 2.53* 
 (-0.23) (-0.21) (-0.98) (0.39) (0.33) (-0.99) (0.93) (0.94) (2.14) 
Authoritarianism  1.46 2.12*  2.15** 2.83**  0.84 0.70 
  (1.28) (2.08)  (2.83) (3.19)  (-0.71) (-1.18) 
Private Sector   0.76   0.72*   1.21 
   (-1.76)   (-2.42)   (1.56) 
Wealth   1.12   1.04   0.97 
   (1.13)   (0.48)   (-0.34) 
Education   0.79   0.75   1.11 
   (-1.18)   (-1.57)   (0.62) 
Female   1.05   1.26   0.83 
   (0.31)   (1.60)   (-1.43) 
Age Cohort   1.19**   1.05   0.85** 
   (2.73)   (0.79)   (-3.22) 
Econ Last Year   1.43**   1.76**   0.68** 
   (3.23)   (5.90)   (-4.42) 
Moscow   0.79   0.82   1.19 
   (-1.50)   (-1.43)   (1.39) 
Yea-sayer Index   1.68**   1.13   1.12 
   (2.88)   (0.77)   (0.77) 
Observations 1,223 1,223 872 1,115 1,115 821 1,223 1,223 872 
z-statistics in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 2  Personality Traits and Values 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Redistribution 
Ordered Logit 
Redistribution 
Ordered Logit 
Gay 
Law 
Ordered 
Logit 
Gay 
Law 
Ordered 
Logit 
Deport 
Immigrants 
Ordered 
Logit 
Deport 
Immigrants 
Ordered 
Logit 
Strong 
Military 
Ordered 
Logit 
Strong 
Military 
Ordered 
Logit 
         
Conscientiousness 1.39 1.02 4.38** 3.79** 1.86 2.09 5.39** 5.28** 
 (0.95) (0.05) (4.26) (3.06) (1.79) (1.72) (4.76) (3.84) 
Openness 1.09 0.86 0.77 0.92 1.13 1.03 1.00 0.75 
 (0.22) (-0.33) (-0.69) (-0.18) (0.34) (0.07) (0.01) (-0.64) 
Agreeableness 3.88** 4.46** 2.47* 3.47** 1.89 1.70 4.30** 5.16** 
 (3.50) (3.18) (2.33) (2.67) (1.70) (1.17) (3.76) (3.50) 
Neuroticism 1.69 1.27 0.77 0.90 1.58 1.46 1.43 1.24 
 (1.61) (0.60) (-0.81) (-0.25) (1.44) (0.96) (1.09) (0.54) 
Extraversion 0.93 1.22 1.19 1.12 1.35 1.93 1.43 1.34 
 (-0.18) (0.43) (0.44) (0.24) (0.78) (1.44) (0.94) (0.64) 
Authoritarianism  2.72**  3.60**  2.22*  3.28** 
  (3.02)  (3.85)  (2.53)  (3.62) 
Private Sector  0.82  0.83  0.94  0.79 
  (-1.42)  (-1.41)  (-0.45)  (-1.75) 
Wealth  1.00  0.96  0.88  0.94 
  (0.02)  (-0.47)  (-1.46)  (-0.67) 
Education  1.05  0.95  0.65*  0.51** 
  (0.28)  (-0.26)  (-2.37)  (-3.62) 
Female  1.23  0.75*  0.81  1.03 
  (1.45)  (-2.01)  (-1.46)  (0.20) 
Age Cohort  1.11  1.32**  0.93  1.11 
  (1.79)  (4.78)  (-1.29)  (1.80) 
Econ Last Year  0.99  0.96  0.86  1.15 
  (-0.12)  (-0.46)  (-1.62)  (1.43) 
Moscow  0.97  0.95  1.32*  1.32* 
  (-0.22)  (-0.34)  (2.07)  (2.01) 
Yea-sayer Index  1.54**  1.17  1.42*  1.31 
  (2.67)  (0.98)  (2.24)  (1.70) 
Observations 1,202 863 1,165 839 1,223 872 1,210 869 
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Table 3 Effect of Agreeableness and Mediators On Support for Anti-Gay Legislation 
 
 State Television Live Journal Putin Approval Orthodoxy 
ACME .131 [.040 , .231] 
.078 
[.022 , .157] 
.117 
[.041 , .209] 
.159 
[.054 , .802] 
Direct Effect .459 [.083 , .832] 
.517 
[.136 , .896] 
.487 
[.096 , .877] 
.430 
[.054 , .803] 
Total Effect .590 [.202 , .974] 
.596 
[.208 , .973] 
.605 
[.202 , .995] 
.589 
[.200 , .971] 
% of Total Effect 
Mediated 
.223 
[.125 , .647] 
.129 
[.080 , .372] 
.195 
[.118 , .577] 
.270 
[.163 , ..790] 
 
95 percent confidence intervals are based on nonparametric bootstrap with 1000 resamples. 
Equations were estimated with least squares except for the Live Journal equation where the 
binary mediation outcome was calculated using probit. The results are computed via the 
mediation software (Tingley and Hicks 2011). 
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Figure 1 Comparing Size of Effects of Probability of Voting For Putin 
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